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Perioperative patient harm is frequent: Adverse events, more than half of them preventable, occur in
about 30% of hospital admissions. Surgical in-hospital mortality in Europe is currently as high as 4% on
average. Openly communicating as well as reporting patient harm are key to learning within institutions
and improving patient outcomes, but are hindered by strong barriers in the tense working environment
of perioperative healthcare. Some interventions to overcome such barriers and to improve patient
outcomes are ready for adoption into routine practice. Before implementing safety interventions, speciﬁc
institutional conditions should be considered to ensure local validity. Sustained improvements require
local measurement and long-term monitoring of effects.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Contents
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Surgical patients look forward to a cure or relief for their disease(J. Wacker), michaela.kolbe@
Ltd. This is an open access article uor injury. Above all, they rightly expect not to suffer additional
damages to their health. Surgical and perioperative care is
considered safe if preventable collateral damages stemming from
the process of healthcare are avoided [1], and if care is provided in
line with the famous principle “ﬁrst, do no harm”.
In contrast to this ideal, the rates of preventable adverse events,
patient harm and mortality are alarmingly high in currentnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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adverse events have been reported for periods of several years, in
particular in surgical and perioperative care [4,5], despite the
implementation of quality improvement programs [4e7]. More
sensitive research tools may explain only a part of this observation
[3]. It is not clear if the current state of patient safety results pri-
marily from a lack of highly effective and generalizable patient
safety interventions, reﬂects a problem of adequate measurement
of patient safety [8], or may be related to other issues, like inade-
quate implementation of effective tools [9].
In this review, we provide an updated overview of perioperative
patient harm and summarise concepts that may help to learn from
harm. We also point to the importance of validating any safety
concepts and interventions for the desired setting, ideally before
implementation. Considering communicating and reporting pa-
tient harm essential foundations of institutional learning with the
goal to improve safety and quality of care, we then present
communicationwithin teams and institutions as well as systematic
documentation and reporting as promising strategies to achieve
better patient outcomes. Finally, we consider barriers to these
strategies, and approaches to overcome them.
2. Declining trends in perioperative patient harm are not in
sight
Current research indicates that adverse events occur in about
30% of hospital admissions [3,10], are associated with higher mor-
tality [4], may be preventable in more than 50%, and show constant
or even increasing trends in many healthcare areas [4,6]. This is
particularly true for the perioperative setting. According to the
European Surgical Outcomes Study (EuSOS), mean surgical mor-
tality is as high as 4% before discharge [11]. Adverse events in
surgical patients have been reported to occur in up to 36.8% of
hospitalizations, and had increased from 2005 to 2011 in a study
from the US [4]. Comparable numbers have been reported in a
Swedish study: Over a period of 4 years, no reduction in the rate of
adverse events was seen despite several quality improvement ini-
tiatives [5].
In the Netherlands, a reduction of preventable adverse events
has recently been found after the implementation of several multi-
targeted national patient safety programmes [12], but this effect
was not statistically signiﬁcant, could not be reliably attributed to
these interventions [12], and has led to scepticism about the val-
idity of using the concept of ‘preventable adverse events’ as a gold
standard indicator for patient safety [8,13]. For the perioperative
setting it is interesting to note that mortality rates do not appear to
be determined by complication rates per se, but by the way in-
stitutions manage to respond to such complications [14]. Inade-
quate response to complications may increase mortality. The
number of patients who die after complications divided by the total
number of patients who have suffered complications results in a
rate described as “failure to rescue”, that can be used as an indicator
for hospital quality [14,15]. Besides preventing complications in the
ﬁrst place, it will therefore be important to reduce “failure to
rescue”. Strategies suggested to achieve this include surveillance
and monitoring aiming at early detection of postoperative com-
plications and at early efﬁcient treatment [15,16]. Recent ﬁndings
also suggest that hospital culture and safety climate may be
important to reduce “failure to rescue” [17].
Perioperative adverse events have a detrimental impact on pa-
tient outcomes, and are not caused by surgery alone. For instance,
anaesthesia-speciﬁc risk is very low [18], but anaesthesia man-
agement signiﬁcantly inﬂuences perioperative risk in many less
speciﬁc ways [19]. For example, anaesthesia management may
contribute to ischaemic, thromboembolic, neurological, renal,pulmonary, and infectious adverse events [19]. Indeed, overall
perioperative risk is more important from a patient's perspective
than speciality-speciﬁc risks. Recent evidence suggests increasing
perioperative morbidity: Analyses of large national US databases
identiﬁed increasing trends of major in-hospital complications for
patients undergoing total knee and hip arthroplasties [20], and for
major cancer surgery [21]. In some groups, mortality was appar-
ently lower despite higher complication rates, but some of this
mortalitymay have shifted to intermediate care facilities because of
shorter hospital stays [20].
As these results rely on the results of speciﬁc studies or analyses
of particular registries, it is not clear to what extent they can be
generalised to healthcare systems of other countries, or to indi-
vidual institutions. It is certainly important to base local quality
improvement interventions on locally valid data. However, under-
reporting about incidents and events is frequent [22], and the
extent of perioperative patient harm and the part of it that can be
prevented may be underestimated [2]. In the following, we there-
fore consider in more detail how reporting and open communica-
tionmay help to improve learning from perioperative patient harm,
and how barriers to these valuable tools may be overcome.
3. Formal reporting on perioperative harm may be key to
learningebut is hindered by many barriers
The term “reporting” is not precisely deﬁned, but ideally de-
scribes “the communication of safety relevant information” [1].
“Reporting systems” in healthcare may be understood as a general
term summarising many different activities [1]. With regard to
patient harm however, the term “reporting” is often used in the
literature to describe several establishedmethods of collecting data
on the safety and quality of care. Both incident reporting and
quality reporting are commonly used to collect such data, and have
the potential to contribute to learning from threats to patient safety
and quality. Incident reporting is used sporadically to report rare but
potentially serious events (e.g., critical incident reporting systems,
CIRS [23e25]). Quality reporting is used to collect routine data
systematically according to established, rate-based quality in-
dicators for every patient [23]. Reporting should be integrated with
other multiple information systems and data sources (e.g., admin-
istrative data, chart reviews, audits, and provider-independent,
automatically collected data, e.g. from electronic anaesthesia re-
cords) to obtain a comprehensive picture of patient safety and
quality [1]. Routine data are more likely to reﬂect everyday clinical
practice than research or audit data.
3.1. Potential beneﬁts of reporting
Does reporting actually result in improved patient outcomes? A
quality improvement project in Norway used reporting on clinical
process and outcome indicators and detection of “unnatural vari-
ations” within an anaesthesia institution to monitor safety and
quality of anaesthesia and postoperative care [26]. For example, the
rate of failed brachial plexus blocks was charted. In this way, the
effectiveness of an intervention that included reorganisation of the
regional anaesthesia service and the use of ultrasound guidance
could be assessed [26]. In an Australian study, documentation of
adverse events during anaesthetics, followed by feeding back the
results to clinical staff, led to a signiﬁcant decrease in the rate of the
respective adverse events after 9 months [27]. Evidence for positive
effects on perioperative morbidity and mortality has also been
found for reporting on perioperative normothermia as a quality
metric [28], and for the use of a deﬁned surgical outcome reporting
system (American College of Surgeons, ACS, National Surgical
Quality Improvement Project, NSQIP) [29].
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Reporting systems rely on the cooperation of professionals to
collect the data. Under-reporting is a signiﬁcant problem, especially
when data collection is not automated: Only 5e6.3% of adverse
events identiﬁed with systematic retrospective chart review had
also been correctly self-reported [5,10]. Interestingly, physicians are
less likely to report than nurses [30]. These ﬁndings indicate that
under-reporting may result in overestimation of quality and safety.
They also raise the question about the barriers to reporting. Based
on investigations of barriers to incident reporting, a psychological
framework of such barriers has been derived [24]. This framework
proposed three major thematic groups of barriers. These groups
represent barriers related to the reporting system (e.g., time-
consuming system or not user-friendly), to organisational in-
ﬂuences (e.g., clinical staff not encouraged to report), and to indi-
vidual inﬂuences (e.g., beliefs that reporting does not help to
improve patient safety, fears of legal consequences) [24]. One of the
authors recently surveyed a sample of 55 anaesthesia staff mem-
bers to extend this question from incident reporting to quality
reporting [31]. Integrating the results of this survey with the pro-
posed framework [24] and with results from other literature, three
major groups of barriers to reporting for anaesthesia staff could be
outlined: 1. barriers related to practical working conditions, 2.
barriers related to institutional environment and to in-house
management of the data, and 3. barriers related to individual
negative attitudes and lacking knowledge about reporting. As they
provide a roadmap for approaches to improve reporting, these
three groups are discussed in more detail in the following.
(1) Barriers related to practical working conditions include
limited user-friendliness of reporting systems (e.g., forms too
complicated, deﬁnitions not clear) [20] or unsatisfactory
working conditions during data collection (e.g., additional
workload, lacking time, concomitant duties, interruptions,
noise) [24].
(2) Barriers related to institutional environment and to in-house
management of the data include concerns of legal conse-
quences [24,32], fear of blame [33,34] or being measured by
the data [34] and lacking feedback about the data and results
[24,32,33,35,36]. Interestingly, reporting has been found to
be better in more serious events [23].
(3) Barriers related to individual negative attitudes and lacking
knowledge about reporting include lacking belief in the
general utility of reporting and its effectiveness for
improving patient safety and quality, especially in physicians
[9,24,36].3.3. Facilitators of reporting
Among the published strategies to address these issues not all
have been validated for anaesthesia. In the followingwe summarise
what may be reasonably done in the absence of better evidence.
First, to overcome barriers related to technical and situational
working conditions, promising strategies may include enhancing
the user-friendliness of reporting systems: Mandatory electronic
forms may facilitate enforced data entry and thus capture more
events; at least “no event” must be entered [37]. However, enforced
data entry does not ensure correct entry and resulting false data
may lead to overestimation of quality and safety. To improve the
working conditions during data collection, automated event
detection can be used for indicators that can be automatically
registered (e.g., vital data). However, records should be carefully
checked for artefacts [27,38]. A signiﬁcantly harder challenge is anyattempt to improve working conditions during data entry (noise,
interruptions, and time pressure during data entry). In the quality
improvement project from Norway mentioned above, medical staff
were unburdened by being allowed to delegate tasks to adminis-
trative staff [26,39].
Second, strategies to overcome barriers related to institutional
environment and data management may be embedded into
departmental leadership for the most part, as they are targeting
departmental culture and organisation. Feedback to frontline pro-
fessionals about the data describing the strong and weak points of
their work is vitally important [33]. This may be mutually
instructive for some reasons: A hospital's actual safety performance
may be better appraised by how frontline professionals perceive
the safety climate rather than by how senior managers perceive the
safety climate [40]. Also, senior managers see safety climate less
problematic and more optimistic than frontline professionals [41].
Under-reporting then further supports overestimation of patient
safety and quality. An overoptimistic view of patient safety and
risks may adversely inﬂuence safety-relevant management de-
cisions. It is therefore important to regularly check the quality of
manually collected data [5,10,31]. Timely feedback (ideally real-
time without delay) to clinical staff about the results of collected
data (e.g., postoperative pain scores) may also have positive effects
on patient outcomes [35]. Prerequisites of successful feedback
discussions are reliable anonymisation and conﬁdentiality of the
data ﬂow, and a collaborative, non-punitive environment [27].
Third, strategies to overcome barriers related to individual
negative attitudes and lacking knowledge may supposedly be
tackled with educational interventions, role model behaviour, and
advocacy of reporting and adhering to best practice by professional
societies. Educational interventions aimed at improved event-
reporting behaviour in anaesthesia residents and medical stu-
dents have been found to improve reports as well as attitudes, but
the duration of this effect is unclear [42]. Senior colleagues acting as
role models can openly encourage reporting [33]. If leaders provide
clear safety directives and explicitly encourage employees to report
errors, the number of reported treatment errors may increase [43].
Professional societies have an important role for disseminating
evidence-based recommendations and advocating professional
peak performance: The European Society of Anaesthesiology (ESA)
has launched the Helsinki Declaration on Patient Safety in Anaes-
thesiology in 2010 [44]. This document describes principles and
requirements that are important for learning from near misses and
from patient harm, such as critical incident reporting system (CIRS),
morbidity and mortality conferences, and an annual safety report
[44]. Other professional anaesthesiology societies provide similar
support.
3.4. About positive and negative motivators to report
Most of the described strategies depend on cooperation of
involved staff. It is important to reﬂect on the involved clinicians'
motivation to actually engage in reporting. In the perioperative
setting, clinicians are usually very busy with patient care. Safety
and quality reporting may at ﬁrst be considered an activity that
steals precious time, adding an additional workload, having usually
no immediate consequences for providers, and could make clini-
cians look like worse anaesthesiologists or even expose them to
law-suits.
The most important intrinsic motivation of healthcare providers
is knowing that their individual performance affects their patient's
health. The special relationship between clinicians and their pa-
tients is based on mutual trust and reﬂected in a particular legal
background deﬁning speciﬁc duties of medical personnel, and
rights of patients. It also explains why clinicians fear complications
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sense of personal responsibility [45], that may leave them trau-
matized if their patients are harmed: In case of unexpected adverse
events or patient injuries, they can become “second victims” [45].
Patient outcomes may differ depending on which physician pro-
vides the anaesthetic [46,47]. This can be due to varying levels of
clinical skills and knowledge [46]. Therefore, physicians may have a
considerable interest in knowing their strengths and weaknesses in
order to improve, where needed [45].
As an extrinsic motivator, compliance with regulatory re-
quirements may become a driving force for reporting if these reg-
ulations are adequately enforced or incentives are offered [48]. In
the US, ﬁnancial penalties are used to enhance reporting [49].
Indeed, non-compliance with mandatory reporting can lead to
reduction of service reimbursements for Medicare patients of up to
4% of the covered services until 2017 [50]. Patient outcomes may
actually differ signiﬁcantly between individual institutions [51],
and between individual providers as mentioned above. In health-
care systems using value-based reimbursement of healthcare ser-
vices rather than fee for service, transparency and benchmarking
between institutions is therefore particularly important.
4. Informal team communication may be key to
learningebut is hindered by many barriers
In addition to communicating and discussing the results of
reporting and their consequences [32,35], various ways of informal
team communication contribute to patient outcomes. For instance,
patients of surgical teams that reported higher levels of commu-
nicationwith attending and resident physicians have been found to
have lower risk-adjusted morbidity [52], and reliable handover
communication during clinical care transitions signiﬁcantly
contributed to the quality of care [53]. In addition, intraoperative
transition of anaesthesia care (handover) was strongly associated
with in-hospital morbidity and mortality in a recent analysis of a
large perioperative registry, and multiple transitions were associ-
ated with considerably higher risks [54]. Further, communicating
concerns immediately within the operating room team may be a
way of directly preventing harm in the ﬁrst place [55]. However,
this seems to be rare and difﬁcult.
4.1. Speaking up about safety concerns
Speaking up in a clinical situation has been deﬁned as follows:
“Assertive communication through questions or statements of
opinion or informationwith appropriate persistence until there is a
clear resolution” [55,56]. Asking if something potentially relevant is
not clear, sharing opinions and ideas, or voicing concern is impor-
tant for problem-solving, prevention of mistakes, and for learning
[55]. Though speaking up is crucial in healthcare, it is no less
important in other domains [57]. In anaesthesia, research has found
a positive association of speaking up and team performance in the
simulated setting [58]. Barriers and facilitators to speaking up have
also been reported [58].
4.2. Barriers to speaking up
In a recent simulation study of two-person anaesthesia teams
managing simulated critical events that required speaking up, 41%
did not speak up appropriately [59]. In another simulation study
which included similar speaking-up possibilities, 72% of the partici-
pants remained silent [60]. Frequent barriers to anaesthesiologist's
speaking up in the operating room include uncertainty about the
issue, stereotypes of other teammembers (e.g., assuming that nurses
care more about surgeons than anaesthesiologists), familiarity withthe speaking-up receiver (e.g., poor relationship with the recipient),
respect for experience, and the repercussion expected [61].
4.3. Facilitators to speaking up
Frequent facilitators to anaesthesiologist's speaking up inclu-
deein addition to realizing the speaking-up problem at alle having
a communication rubric for speaking-up (i.e., having a sense of how
to speak up effectively, for example by using the two-challenge rule
or ISBAR), feeling certain about the consequences of speaking up,
feeling familiar with the speaking-up receiver and getting help
(e.g., to socially validate the speaking-up issue and to discuss how
to proceed) [61,62]. Interestingly, familiarity with the person to
speak up to was perceived both a barrier and facilitator. Further
important facilitators are feeling psychological safe and explicitly
invited and appreciated for speaking up [63,64]. Teaching
communication algorithms to anaesthesia care providers is another
possibility to enable them to speak up. Studies evaluating such
speciﬁc training interventions in the simulated setting indicate
how challenging this effort is since the actual speaking-up behav-
iour did not seem to increase consistently [61,62,65]. As an addi-
tional possibility, combining technical (e.g., difﬁcult airway
management) with ‘non-technical’ training (e.g., team communi-
cation while managing a difﬁcult airway) can improve attitudes
towards teamwork and the perception of psychological safety, and
thus create conditions that allow for speaking up [66,67].
Furthermore, it is possible that interventions designed to
improve teamwork more generally may also have a positive inﬂu-
ence on speaking up behaviour. A number of patient safety in-
terventions, mostly studied in multidisciplinary acute care teams,
focused on team outcomes such as communication, situational
awareness, leadership, role clarity, and coordination [68e70]. Some
investigations of safety interventions also focused on patient out-
comes [68]. For example, the TeamSTEPPS® intervention has been
related to signiﬁcant decreases in medication and transfusion er-
rors [68,71]. The Veteran's Affairs Medical Team-Training then has
been associated with a reduction in mortality [68]. Similarly, the
implementation of the Veteran's Health Administration (VHA)
Medical Team Training program, which comprises active team-
work, communication strategies like challenging each other about
safety risks, brieﬁngs and debrieﬁngs, and communication rules for
care transitions, has been found to be associated with lower sur-
gical mortality [72]. Recently, the implementation of a Crew
Resource Management (CRM) program at an academic medical
centre has been reported to be followed by a considerable 25.7%
reduction in adverse events [73]. Due to the cost savings from this
reduction, a return on investment for CRM implementation of
$12.6e28.0 million over three years was estimated [73].
5. Evaluating safety interventions for implementation into
practice
The quality of healthcare can be evaluated using a well-known
framework proposed by Avedis Donabedian [74]. Thereby, ele-
ments of patient outcomes (e.g., functional results, morbidity,
mortality, satisfaction), structure (e.g., stafﬁng, training, technolo-
gies), and process (e.g., evidence-based and safe practices, timeli-
ness) of healthcare are repeatedly evaluated [74]. Methods and
tools for the evaluation of quality and safety of care (e.g., reporting
systems, interventions to improve reporting) aim at improving
healthcare outcomes, and require ﬁnancial, human and other re-
sources. Such methods and tools are necessary for effective
learning from perioperative harm. As any other healthcare inter-
vention, they should be rigorously assessed for their effectiveness
to reliably map the actual state of perioperative quality and safety.
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because instead of being effective they may also prove ineffective,
wasteful, or even harmful [75]. For many interventions, evidence is
only available about their efﬁcacy (intervention works under study
conditions) [76]. For implementation into clinical practice however,
evidence about their effectiveness (intervention works under real
life conditions) [76] is needed. Considering the limited resources in
healthcare, evidence about cost-effectiveness (intervention is
“worth” its price) is also required [76]: If two methods are equally
effective, the less costly should be adopted. The recently published
review “Making Health Care Safer II” provides comprehensive as-
sessments of interventions used for reporting and for improving
communication, such as team training and surgical outcome
measurements (ACS NSQIP) [69]. In individual hospitals, local val-
idity should be carefully veriﬁed before adopting an intervention
into clinical practice.
6. Future research
Among other issues, future research should be directed at: 1.
evaluating the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness to improve pa-
tient outcomes of interventions designed to improve formal
reporting and informal communication such as speaking up [42], of
educational interventions to improve reporting in different clinical
environments, of methods to assess and monitor the reliability of
data collection in quality and safety reporting, and of regulatory
mechanisms for improving compliance with quality and safety
standards and reporting requirements; 2. identifying quality and
safety indicators that reliably reﬂect the performance of in-
stitutions and clinicians, and of the quality and safety of care; and 3.
exploring the perspective of patients on quality and safety issues,
and integrating this perspective into safety and quality indicators
used for performance measurement [49].
7. Conclusion
Perioperative patient harm is frequent and preventable in about
half of the cases. Learning from patient harm to improve safety and
quality of care is imperative. Communication and reporting of pa-
tient harm are key elements of learning within institutions and can
improve patient outcomes, but they are hindered by strong barriers
in the tense working environment of perioperative healthcare.
Deﬁcient communication and under-reporting may affect patient
safety and outcomes. Barriers to reporting may be related to work
conditions, to institutional culture, or to general attitudes. In-
terventions are available to overcome such barriers and to improve
patient outcomes. Some are ready for adoption into routine practice,
while others require further study of their effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness. Before implementing safety interventions, their local
validity should be scrutinised with regard to the speciﬁc institu-
tional safety issues and general conditions. Sustained improvements
at a local level may only be ensured if the overall effects of an
adopted intervention are measured and monitored over time.
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